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 Difficulties in evaluating public engagement
initiatives: reflections on an evaluation of the UK
GM Nation? public debate about transgenic crops
Gene Rowe, Tom Horlick-Jones, John Walls and Nick Pidgeon
In the realm of risk management, and policy-making more generally, “public
engagement” is often advocated as an antidote to pathologies associated with
traditional methods of policy-making, and associated deficit-model-driven
communication strategies. The actual benefits of public engagement are,
however, difficult to establish without thorough evaluation of specific en-
gagement processes. Unfortunately, rigorous evaluation is difficult, and,
perhaps for this reason, it has rarely been undertaken. In this paper we
highlight a number of these difficulties in the light of our experiences in
evaluating a major engagement initiative, namely the GM Nation? public
debate on the possible commercialization of transgenic crops, which took
place in Britain in 2003. The difficulties we identify seem likely to be
relevant to many, if not most, engagement evaluations. They are concerned
with both theoretical/normative (how one should evaluate) and practical (how
one does evaluate) issues. We suggest a number of possible solutions to these
evaluation difficulties.
1. Introduction: public engagement and the issue of evaluation
One evident trend in contemporary democratic societies is the growth in enthusiasm within
policy circles for public “engagement” or “participation” as a means of approaching certain
difficult issues like the management of risks. In “public engagement” the public is involved
in some limited manner in the practices of policy-making (e.g. governmental or regulatory)
bodies; though there seems confusion as to what extent of involvement is necessary for a
particular event to qualify as a case of engagement per se (Rowe and Frewer, 2005). This
model for policy-making contrasts with the predominant model in representative democ-
racies in which the involvement of the public is limited to voting at election time, or via
membership and influence of pressure groups. According to these arrangements, subsequent
decisions are left to elected representatives in government, supported by a “neutral”
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administrative executive. Such decisions may draw upon advice from unelected experts
(either individual advisers or expert committees) (Jasanoff, 1990).
“Engagement” is achieved through various means or mechanisms. In some cases, it is
enacted through changing institutional forms—such as co-opting public members or
stakeholders on to existing advisory committees. In many cases, however, involvement is
achieved through one-off events rather than continuous processes. The use of referenda and
consultation documents (on which interested parties can comment) are fairly traditional
means of involving the public. More contemporary means include the use of activities such
as citizens’ juries and consensus conferences, in which members of the lay public, selected
to act as representatives, are provided with balanced information, and required to debate an
issue and propose recommendations (POST, 2001; Rowe and Frewer, 2000).
There are a variety of practical and ethical reasons for policy-making bodies to involve
lay people in policy-making. Political theorists have invoked democratic theory, procedural
justice, fairness and human rights, as providing the moral basis for involvement (e.g.
Fiorino, 1990; National Research Council, 1996). It is also important to recognize that in
many policy contexts there exists a high degree of scientific uncertainty combined with a
plurality of value-based perspectives. In such cases decisions may be based to a significant
extent upon the values of the involved experts, which, in themselves, have no greater
inherent validity than those held by lay publics. There is also a need to contextualize
scientific knowledge to take account of the specificity of the issue in question. In this regard,
local lay knowledges may provide important insights in addressing a range of practical
issues (e.g. Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Horlick-Jones, 1998, 2004; Wynne, 1991).
According to this perspective, engagement provides an “antidote” to pathologies
associated with a “deficit-model” approach to decision-making; namely one that regards
public disagreement with official positions as arising simply from an ignorance of technical
facts (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000; Irwin and
Wynne, 1996). In any case, making decisions without public support is liable to lead to a
number of practical difficulties, such as confrontation, disruption, boycott, and public
distrust. Indeed, a decline in trust in policymakers has been widely noted, and is regarded as
having compromised the perceived legitimacy of governance in some areas of policy
development (e.g. Frewer, 1999). A transition seems to have occurred from a position where
information was seen as the key to resolving a knowledge deficit, and so resolving lay
opposition, to one in which regaining trust in governments and regulators is seen as vital to
solving a perceived legitimation (or trust) deficit (Walls et al., 2004).
The actual benefits of engagement are, however, difficult to establish without carefully
evaluating specific real-world examples of this practice. Indeed, the evaluation of engage-
ment exercises is important for all parties involved as it addresses a range of functions:
financial (to ensure the proper use of public or institutional money), practical (to learn from
past mistakes to allow exercises to be run better in future), ethical/moral (to establish fair
representation and ensure that those involved are not deceived as to the impact of their
contribution) and research-related (to increase our understanding of human and organiza-
tional behavior). As such, few would deny that evaluation should be done when possible.
However, there exist only a relatively small number of rigorously conducted evaluations
within the academic literature. A recent review of these by Rowe and Frewer revealed a
paucity of empirical work, and a tendency for papers to focus on the results of evaluations
and their implications, with rather less concern for evaluation methodology and its
difficulties (Rowe and Frewer, 2004). Arguably one reason for this is, simply, that
evaluation is difficult and a range of theoretical and practical difficulties form a significant
barrier to would-be evaluators.
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A concrete discussion of the barriers to rigorous evaluation would therefore seem to be
much needed. Such a discussion may benefit both an academic audience, in terms of
identifying difficulties in the research process and ways to improve the collection, analysis,
and interpretation of data, and a practitioner audience, in terms of identifying practical
barriers to conducting and evaluating engagement processes. This paper aims to speak to
both of these audiences. In this spirit we present reflections on an evaluation that we
conducted of a major national engagement event in the UK—the GM Nation? public debate.
We begin with a discussion of the context for the debate, then go on to a description of the
debate process, how we became involved, and how we set about the evaluation. In the main
part of the paper we identify both the theoretical and empirical/practical difficulties we
faced, and ways in which we attempted to counter these. Our detailed evaluation of
the debate has been reported elsewhere (e.g. Horlick-Jones et al., 2004, submitted; Pidgeon
et al., 2005; Rowe et al., submitted).
2. The UK GM Nation? public debate: context and genesis
In the UK, as in much of Europe (and indeed, elsewhere in the world), there has been
significant controversy surrounding the growing of genetically modified (GM) crops, and
their use in food products. In the UK, this has been marked by a number of significant
events, including the voluntary removal by retailers of at least one food product (GM tomato
paste) from supermarket shelves, controversy over shipments of unlabeled GM soya to
Europe by the multinational company Monsanto, and, in 1998–9, a widely aired disagree-
ment amongst scientists about the safety of GM potatoes (the so-called Pusztai affair).
Throughout this period Eurobarometer survey findings suggested that lay opposition to GM
food was reaching a peak in many European countries including the UK (Gaskell and Bauer,
2001). The year 1998 also saw the British government initiate a scientific programme of
nationwide farm-scale evaluations (FSEs) of selected GM herbicide-tolerant crops to
evaluate the impacts of their cultivation regimes upon farmland biodiversity. These sites
were subsequently targeted by anti-GM campaigners for attacks that attempted to destroy
the crops, leading to a number of arrests. For more information on the controversies
surrounding the growing use of GM crops, see, for example: Halford (2004); Myhr and
Traavik (2003); Nielsen et al. (2003); Thorpe and Robinson (2004).
These events occurred during a period when the policy communities in the UK, and
other parts of Europe, were just coming to terms with the events surrounding the bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad cow” crisis of the mid-1990s. BSE marked a
clear turning point in the way UK science policy, and with this risk assessment practice, was
viewed (see “The Phillips Report”: Lord Phillips et al., 2000). Indeed, a number of ensuing
reports recommended that scientists and policymakers engage in dialogue with interested
parties regarding risk, and regarding science and technology issues more widely (Cabinet
Office, 2002; POST, 2001). The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee in
particular, in its report on Science and Society, diagnosed an apparent “crisis of trust” in
science policy-making in the UK, recommending that in order to regain public trust greater
openness and transparency in the policy process should occur (House of Lords Select
Committee on Science and Technology, 2000; see also Walls et al., 2004).
In this context of controversy, the GM Nation? public debate arose as a direct result of
a recommendation to the British government by a new multi-stakeholder consultative body,
the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC). The AEBC had been
established to provide the government with strategic advice concerning wider social and
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political aspects of the regulation of agricultural transgenic species. In its report of 2001
entitled Crops on Trial (AEBC, 2001), the Commission considered the controversy
generated by the government’s farm-scale trials, and concluded that public policy on GM
crops should “expose, respect and embrace the differences of view which exist, rather than
bury them” (AEBC, 2001: 12). It went on to call for:
an open and inclusive process of decision-making around whether the GM crops being
grown in the FSEs should be commercialised, within a framework which extends to
broader questions. (AEBC, 2001: 19)
The report also called for an improved understanding of the basis of public views on these
matters, and for the future role of GM crops within UK agriculture to be considered in “a
wider public debate involving a series of regional discussion meetings” (AEBC, 2001: 25).
In response the government asked the AEBC to advise on how best to implement such
a debate. Subsequently, in her letter to the AEBC of 25 July 2002, the Secretary of State
responsible for the debate, Margaret Beckett, confirmed that a public dialogue on GM would
take place. The government, she stated, was committed to a “genuine, balanced discussion,
and also to listening to what people say” (UK Government, 2002). At this stage she also set
out the three-component form that the overall programme of dialogue would take. This
included a “strand” that would review the science of GM and another one that would
examine the economic implications of commercialization, both taking place in addition to
the public debate. The intention was “to create a dialogue between all strands of opinion on
GM issues.” With the letter, the government published a detailed note responding to the
AEBC advice that had been submitted on 26 April. The terms of reference for the overall
program of dialogue were specified as follows:
c To identify, using methods which focus on grass roots opinion, the questions which the
public has about GM issues, avoiding as far as possible the polarization that has
characterized so much of the discussion to date;
c To develop, from this framing of the issues and through a wholly open process, the
provision of comprehensive evidence-based information to the public on scientific,
economic and other aspects of GM;
c To provide people with the opportunity to debate the issues openly and to reach their
own informed judgments on this subject;
c To provide information to government on how questions raised by the public have
shaped the course of the debate, including on the scientific, economic and other aspects
of GM.
3. The design of the GM Nation? public debate process
GM Nation? took place during a six-week period from 3 June to 18 July 2003. It was
overseen by an independent Steering Board drawn from members of the AEBC together
with a number of co-opted individuals. Membership of the Steering Board included
stakeholders from across the spectrum of opinion on GM agriculture. Much of the day-to-
day implementation of the debate was carried out by an “arms length” agency of
government, the Central Office of Information (COI), which acted as the main contractor to
the Steering Board.
In November 2002, and prior to the main debate process, nine preliminary discussion
groups (known as “Foundation Discussion Workshops”) were convened in various locations
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across the UK, eight of which comprised members of the general public who were not
already actively engaged with the issues, while the ninth comprised those who were actively
involved and interested in GM issues. Each workshop involved 16–20 participants. They
were facilitated by two moderators, and lasted approximately three hours. The primary aim
of these was to investigate how a cross-section of ordinary citizens would make sense of the
GM issues. It was intended that these insights into lay framing of the issues would make it
possible to design the debate process in such a way that lay perspectives could shape the
terms of the engagement. The findings could also be used in the production of stimulus
materials for use in subsequent stages of the debate.
The main “debate” process, conducted in the summer of 2003, comprised three
principal engagement mechanisms.
c A series of open public meetings, which anybody could attend, organized into three
levels or “Tiers”. Tier 1 meetings (three in England and one each in Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland) were conceived of as “national” high profile events, and were
professionally facilitated. These attracted approximately 1000 participants in total. Tier
2 meetings, of which there were about 40, were typically hosted by a local authority or
other major organization, often with the assistance of the main debate contractors. Tier
3 meetings, typically organized by local voluntary organizations, were highly variable
in terms of their character and formality. The contractors estimated that over 600 of
these events took place. In all some 20,000 individuals across the UK were estimated to
have taken part in the various open meetings (PDSB, 2003).
c A dedicated interactive debate website, which contained a range of debate materials and
interactive resources. This website recorded over 24,000 unique visitors during the
course of the debate.
c A series of 10 closed discussions with ordinary members of the public, known as
“narrow-but-deep” groups, which were conceived as a “control” on the character of the
discussions produced by the self-selected participants in the open meetings. Here
“narrow” refers to the limited scope of representation (only 77 members of the public
took part, albeit being recruited to reflect a broad demographic cross-section of the UK
population), and “deep” refers to the anticipated extended level of engagement and
deliberation in these groups, in comparison to that typically possible at the open
meetings. These groups met twice, with a gap of two weeks between which participants
were invited to explore the GM issue individually, using official stimulus materials and
any other information that they could access, and to keep diaries of their discoveries
(including newspaper clippings, website downloads etc.), thoughts, relevant conversa-
tions and so on (PDSB, 2003: para 194).
The Steering Board’s final conclusions and report were based upon a reading of several data
streams: primarily qualitative, including rapporteurs’ reports from meetings, analysis of the
narrow-but-deep discussions, and open-ended feedback responses (letters and e-mails
received); but also quantitative, from 13 standard attitude questions on a feedback ques-
tionnaire that was distributed in paper form but could also be completed on the debate
website. The feedback questionnaire in particular proved pivotal, with a total of 36,553
responses obtained in almost equal proportions from paper copies distributed to meeting
organizers and its equivalent website format. The 77 narrow-but-deep participants also
completed this questionnaire, albeit twice: once at the commencement of their involvement
and again at the beginning of their second meeting.
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4. The evaluation process, and brief results
At the time the GM debate was proposed, several members of our research team had been
monitoring the work of the AEBC for a period of about 18 months. In August 2002 we
wrote to the AEBC, setting out our intention to follow the debate, and expressing an interest
in having a close involvement in the process of evaluation. The importance of having a
systematic evaluation of the process in order to learn lessons for future policy development
had previously been noted by the AEBC in its initial guidance to government on the conduct
of the debate. Though an appointment by competitive tendering would have been more
satisfactory from the point of view of evaluating a publicly accountable process, the debate
budget was insufficient to allow the Steering Board to fund its own systematic evaluation.
We were subsequently invited (in September 2002) to present a detailed evaluation
proposal to the debate’s Steering Board, on the basis of which we were appointed as the
debate’s official evaluators. This quasi-contractual arrangement was achieved by means of
a formal exchange of letters which were subsequently posted on the debate’s website
(www.gmnation.org.uk).
Our involvement was only formalized relatively late into the debate process, after much
discussion had already taken place in the Steering Board on the purpose, nature, and
implementation of the debate. Our first issue was to decide upon the theoretical basis for the
evaluation. That is, against what benchmarks would we evaluate the event? We decided
upon the use of several different sets of evaluation criteria, in order to reflect different
perspectives on engagement quality and what this should entail: sponsor perspectives,
participant perspectives, and a normative perspective informed by the academic literature
(which proposed how engagement exercises in general should be conducted).
The sponsor perspective on what would make the exercise a “success” was not initially
very clear, beyond the general aim of somehow involving the public in debate on the GM
issue. After some prompting, the Steering Board eventually produced a list of objectives,
which included:
c “to allow the public to frame the issues” (objective 1);
c “to focus on getting people at the grass roots level whose voice has not yet been heard
to participate in the programme” (2);
c “to create new and effective opportunities for the deliberative debate about the
issues” (3);
c “to create widespread awareness among the UK population of the programme of debate
. . . and give widespread opportunities to register views” (5);
c “to calibrate [sic] the views of organisations who have already made their views known
by contrasting their views with other participants in the debate” (8).
The document that details these objectives also included a subsequent section entitled “How
will we know that the programme of debate has been successful?” (PDSB, 2003: Appendix
B). This section identified a further four “indicators” of success. The indicators were:
c The extent of public awareness of the programme;
c The views of participants in the debate “about what they felt should be the criteria
for success . . .”;
c The extent to which “informed commentators” felt the exercise has been credible,
innovative, balanced, and had moved the debate “beyond the polarisation that has so far
characterised much of the discussion about GM crops”;
c The extent to which the report from the debate “could reasonably be said to have had an
impact on Government”.
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Indeed, the first Foundation Discussion Workshop had already taken place (14 November
2002) before the evaluators received a copy of the Steering Board’s list of objectives and
indicators of success. (At a meeting of the PDSB on 7 November there was a discussion of
draft objectives with an action to the secretariat to circulate the final draft in the light
of comments by the members. Though we were aware that draft objectives had been
discussed, we did not receive the final draft until after 14 November.) This lack of clarity on
the precise aims of the event was a major criticism of the event (not evaluation), noted in our
evaluation and raised in the subsequent commentary of a House of Commons Select
Committee (House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2003).
Of course, the participants might have different perspectives on the rationale for the
event and how it ought to be judged than the sponsors. Hence, we attempted to tap into
participants’ own criteria for evaluating the event, focusing on those attending the main
visible component of the debate, namely the Tier 1 meetings. In our questionnaires
distributed to participants (described shortly) we included a number of open questions
asking participants what they thought were the good and bad points from the event, and
from analysis of responses we inferred their criteria.
Our third set of normative criteria was informed by the literature. Despite voluminous
writings on public engagement, and copious assertions as to the necessary requirements for
an exercise to be successful, there were relatively few frameworks to which we could turn.
We chose that formulated by Rowe and Frewer (2000), which identified nine distinct criteria
that a participation exercise should fulfil in order to be deemed successful. These criteria—
distilled from a review of the relevant literature—are as follows:
c Representativeness: The public participants should comprise a broadly representative
sample of the population of the affected public.
c Independence: The participation process should be conducted in an independent,
unbiased way.
c Early Involvement: The public should be involved as early as possible in the process as
soon as value judgments become salient.
c Influence: The output of the procedure should have a genuine impact on policy.
c Transparency: The process should be transparent so that the public can see what is
going on and how decisions are being made.
c Resource Accessibility: Public participants should have access to the appropriate
resources to enable them to successfully fulfil their brief.
c Task Definition: The nature and scope of the participation task should be clearly
defined.
c Structured Decision Making: The participation exercise should use/provide appropriate
mechanisms for structuring and displaying the decision-making process.
c Cost Effectiveness: The procedure should in some sense be cost effective.
Our choice of these criteria was influenced not only by the relative paucity of other
normative frameworks, but also by the presence of one of the original authors in the
evaluation team, and by the previous use of the framework in a past evaluation (Rowe et al.,
2004), ensuring that there were extant instruments (questionnaires; a check-list) that could
be used and adapted for the present evaluation. We did not adopt this framework wholesale,
however, but adapted it to present circumstances. For example, we redefined “Structured
Decision Making” as “Structured Dialogue,” since participants were not intended to make
any decision per se, and we omitted consideration of the Cost Effectiveness criterion,
since this seemed difficult to establish and conceptually unclear. We comment upon
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issues surrounding the choice and use of evaluation criteria in the later discussion of
evaluation difficulties.
In order to conduct the evaluation we adopted a multi-method approach that used both
qualitative and quantitative methods. This drew upon well-developed quantitative tech-
niques and more recently developed qualitative approaches within the evaluation literature
(e.g. Rossi et al., 1999; Shaw, 1999). Thus we used participant questionnaires, structured
observation, in-depth interviews, media and document analysis and a major survey of
public opinion.
Specifically, one member of the evaluation team attended each of the Foundation
Discussion Workshops (save for that using “actively involved participants”), each of the
Tier 1 meetings, several Tier 2 events, and two of the “narrow-but-deep” groups. Observers
used an observation schedule that identified various activities and outputs that would enable
us to comment upon how the events succeeded against our normative criteria, though
observers also had the freedom to note broader impressions on how the events were
progressing (i.e. they were not entirely constrained by the schedule). Participant ques-
tionnaires were also distributed to those attending the Foundation Discussion Workshops (all
of these), the Tier 1 events, several Tier 2 events, and the “narrow-but-deep” groups. There
were in fact two questionnaires—a short questionnaire, given to participants to complete
immediately after certain events (e.g. the Foundation Discussion Workshops), and a long
version that participants in the various events completed at home, and which they returned
to us via postage paid envelopes (the reasons for these two forms will be explained later).
The longer questionnaires included a number of open-ended questions at the start, asking,
for example, what were the good and bad points about the events. Responses to these were
used to infer the participants’ own evaluation criteria. Various closed questions then
addressed participants’ perceptions of the events in terms of our normative criteria.
Evaluation team members also attended the various open meetings held by the debate
Steering Board, conducted interviews with several Board members and other important
stakeholders (at various times throughout and after the debate), and collected all documenta-
tion pertaining to meeting minutes, contractor reports, and so on (to support our subsequent
analysis). We also commissioned a major public opinion survey to assess the views of a
representative sample of the public on GM food (using the attitude items from the
organizers’ own feedback questionnaires), enabling us to consider how representative were
the attitudes of debate participants. Furthermore, we monitored media reports—over the
course of the debate and at the time of the release of the final report on the exercise—from
all of the English national daily and Sunday newspapers; the main national news bulletins
and current affairs programmes on the five terrestrial television channels and on BBC Radio;
selected regional and local newspapers; and Internet news services and bulletin boards
supported by selected newspaper and broadcasting organizations.
In summary, we found that, in spite of a number of positives (e.g. the Foundation
Discussion Workshops and Tier 1 events were enjoyable for participants, and generally
perceived to be fairly and competently run by the organizers), there were a number of
significant problems with the debate. For example, the participants were not particularly
representative of the wider public (one of our normative criteria, and also an implicit
criterion of the sponsors and the participants themselves), and they tended to be more
negative (or at least, less positive) about GM food than the UK public. The ultimate
influence (another of our normative criteria) of the debate was also minor (as suspected
might be the case by participants at the time), as became apparent later, when subsequent
policy was set in accordance to other concerns and with no clear input from the debate
results. Resources (especially in terms of time) were also insufficient. Precise details of all
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the methods we used, and the results of our analysis, are reported elsewhere (e.g. Horlick-
Jones et al., 2004, submitted; Pidgeon et al., 2005; Rowe et al., submitted).
5. Difficulties in conducting the evaluation
Here we present the main difficulties we encountered in the form of the various dilemmas
we faced, how we did/did not counter them, and their wider theoretical and practical
implications for other evaluations. We focus on the following main issues:
c whether evaluation should be an add-on extra or integral to the engagement process;
c selecting evaluation criteria;
c measurement issues;
c data quality;
c when is the evaluation exercise complete?
c relations with the debate organizers and other stakeholders;
c the resource demands of the evaluation exercise.
5.1. Evaluation: add-on or integral process?
As indicated previously, the issue of evaluation was not initially integral to the GM Nation?
debate. Within the context of a cash-limited process, evaluation did not emerge as a priority.
Indeed, the Chair of the Public Debate Steering Board stated at a public meeting that “there
was no indication of any enthusiasm on the part of government to undertake such an
evaluation itself” (Malcolm Grant, AEBC Meeting, 11–12 December 2003, Eden Project,
Cornwall). A number of subsequent difficulties in the evaluation process undoubtedly
stemmed from its “add-on” nature.
From the sponsors’ perspective, lack of evaluation planning limited its options: it was
not able to seek tenders to do the job, and was fortunate that we were available and eager to
do the task without payment. The late presence of evaluators also raised concerns with the
recruited contractors and sub-contractors, who clearly felt a degree of disquiet at suddenly
finding out that their activities would be under scrutiny, leading to some difficult negotia-
tions amongst the various parties that would not have been necessary had the evaluation
component been designed-in at the beginning. For the contractors and sub-contractors, the
problem must have been magnified by the presence of only fairly general working briefs and
a lack of explicit guidelines as to how their activities were going to be judged.
From our perspective as evaluators, this relatively late involvement led to a degree of
tension with the (justifiably) concerned contractors, and meant that the basis on which the
evaluation would be conducted had to be rapidly revised while the process was already
underway. Thus, although we had settled upon the normative framework we would use as
one basis for the evaluation, the event was already underway (as noted, the first Foundation
Discussion Workshop had already taken place) before we received a copy of the Steering
Board’s list of objectives and indicators of success, i.e., before we had the sponsors’
evaluation criteria to work with.
An important lesson from this is that evaluation should be a fundamental part of the
participation process. Preferably, proper contractual arrangements should be established,
setting out, for example, the bounds of the evaluation and extent of evaluator access to
relevant processes and information. This requirement stems not only from pragmatic and
diplomatic considerations (in order to pre-empt potential difficulties with those running the
event), but also from a need to ensure full accounting of the value of the entire process (i.e.
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the validity of the evaluation). For example, if evaluators wished to establish the “fairness”
of an exercise, they would arguably need access to the preliminary debates by the sponsors
in which they set the terms of reference of the exercise, deciding such issues as who should
be involved, how they should be recruited, what should be expected of them, and how their
involvement should be operationalized. If accurate documentation of initial decisions were
available (e.g. minutes of Steering Board meetings), this problem might be partially
overcome—but if not, substantial important activities with bearing upon the ultimate
effectiveness of the exercise might have already passed out of reach of the evaluators, to the
detriment of the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the evaluation.
One other important issue worth considering is that some form of “evaluation” (or at
least, informed commentary) might take place on a participation exercise after the event and
irrespective of the desire of the sponsors. Such evaluations might be based on only partial
information leading to a less-complete evaluation than otherwise, which would be to no-
one’s benefit. This again suggests a need for evaluation planning as soon as possible in the
broader engagement process.
5.2. Selecting evaluation criteria
Perhaps the main difficulty in conducting an evaluation concerns the process of defining
“effectiveness”—that is, selecting, or agreeing upon, suitable evaluation criteria. First,
however, it is important to note that there is a school of thought that regards selecting
evaluation criteria prior to an exercise taking place as problematic. The inductive research
tradition seeks to first collect data and then to induce hypotheses/theories (and indeed,
definitions). Here, stating what is meant by “effectiveness” a priori is seen as constraining
the data one will collect, and so imposing a framework upon the data that might not be
appropriate. This approach, which typically uses qualitative rather than quantitative research
techniques, is particularly apt in new environments where little is previously known, where
quantitative data are difficult to obtain and where hypotheses are difficult to generate (e.g.
Joss, 1995). This position generally leads to “evaluations” that take the form of case studies,
in which results are based upon the evaluators’ subjective interpretations. However, such
exercises create limitations as to the extent to which results may be replicated or
generalized, and pose serious questions about the reliability and validity of their findings
(e.g. Clarke, 1999).
We suggest that such inductive exercises should be termed assessments rather than
evaluations. Although in some respects conducting assessments (as defined here) would
seem appropriate in the complex participation environment, there are various difficulties
involved in taking this approach, exaggerated by the often highly charged political nature of
public participation. Perhaps the greatest of these problems is the different values and
perspectives of those involved (from the sponsors and organizers to the various participants
themselves) each of whom may have different rationales for involvement. Though differing
perspectives are problematic for defining effectiveness a priori, this makes ascertaining
effectiveness after the event a hugely fraught exercise, in which any party disagreeing with
the assessment may (perhaps justifiably) question the conclusions. An analogy may be a
game of football in which invisible goal posts are only revealed at the final whistle. If
effectiveness is defined beforehand (the goal posts are evident) then there can be less cause
for complaint.
In practice the exercise we conducted was rather more pragmatic in nature, with an
emphasis on methodological plurality rather than being constrained by one or other of these
evaluation paradigms. We carried out an evaluation in the sense that we were guided by
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criteria identified in advance (or at the start) of the engagement process, however, our multi-
method approach provided us with a capacity to learn from the process, and so an ability to
arrive at emergent findings (discussed in Horlick-Jones et al., 2004; see also Bloor, 1978;
Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Similar approaches have been advocated by Clarke, who
concludes that pragmatic evaluators need to have regard to paradigmatic differences in
research methods in order to make informed choices within a mixed-method evaluation
design; and Patton, who uses the term “methodological appropriateness” to capture
such an approach, which contrasts with one of paradigmatic orthodoxy (Clarke, 1999;
Patton, 1990).
A clear definition of what it means for a participation exercise to be “effective” provides
a benchmark against which performance may be compared. However, this leads to the
question: is it possible to state a single definition of effectiveness for all participation
exercises, or is each exercise unique, with specific aims and hence a need for a specific
definition of effectiveness? In a review of evaluations in the academic literature, Rowe and
Frewer (2004) found that answers to this question have varied, with many evaluations—at
least implicitly—adopting a definition of effectiveness that is “universal” and apparently
intended to be relevant for participation exercises generally (or at least a specified subgroup
of these). It has been argued that, though any particular exercise may have very precise
aims, these should be able to be phrased in terms of more general effectiveness criteria—for
example, a specific aim to “effect policy in a certain way” may be cast as a general criterion
“to have an impact on policy” (Rowe and Frewer, 2004).
Published definitions of effectiveness have varied on a number of dimensions. One
concerns whether effectiveness is a subjective aspect (and if so, subjective according to who)
or an objective aspect (that either incorporates no subjective opinions from the involved
parties, or perhaps combines all of these in some manner). A second concerns whether
effectiveness should relate to aspects of the quality of the exercise process (how the exercise
was conducted) or aspects of the outcome (such as whether the exercise has a positive
consequence), or indeed, both. Though “universal” definitions of effectiveness in the
literature have varied, certain themes have tended to re-occur, such as the need for
participants to be fairly representative of the affected stakeholders or public, and the need
for exercises to have genuine impact upon the policy or behavior of the sponsors of the
exercise (Rowe and Frewer, 2004).
In our evaluation we decided to utilize one of these “universal” frameworks, namely the
one formulated by Rowe and Frewer (2000), which identified nine distinct criteria that a
participation exercise should fulfil in order to be deemed successful. We did this in part
because this framework had been used before and hence existing instruments were available
(Rowe et al., 2004). However, given criticisms of the universal approach, and uncertainty as
to the complete relevance and comprehensiveness of our chosen evaluation criteria, we
attempted to elicit and use two other sets of criteria specific to the current event.
The first additional set of evaluation criteria was supplied by the organizers. At the time
we submitted our proposal to carry out the independent evaluation, the Steering Board had
still to clearly elucidate its objectives for the debate. Indeed, it was not clear that the Board
had any definite intention to produce a written formalization of the aims of the process. That
a formal statement of the aims for the debate was eventually produced was undoubtedly due
in part to our evaluation proposal, in which we observed that, whilst it was likely that the
debate would have multiple objectives, this created some ambiguity about the nature of
the process and how it might be evaluated. We thus suggested that the Steering Board
should give serious consideration to identifying criteria that could reasonably be thought to
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be widely acceptable (Horlick-Jones et al., 2002). Eventually the Board agreed that the
overall aim of the debate was:
To promote an innovative and effective programme of public debate on issues around
GM in agriculture and the environment, in the context of the possible commercial
growing of GM crops in the UK. The public will frame the issues for debate. Through
the debate, provide meaningful information to Government about the nature and
spectrum of the public’s views, particularly at grass roots level. (PDSB, 2003: 11)
The Steering Board subsequently agreed a set of nine specific objectives and four indicators,
described earlier. Unfortunately, most of these objectives appeared to us to be conceptually
unclear, not measurable in any rigorous or sensible manner (such as the objective to run a
debate that was “innovative”), or were conceptually uninteresting (such as the objective “to
provide a report to Government”). Furthermore, the indicators did not closely address the
stipulated objectives, and indeed, sometimes implied other objectives. For example, ascer-
taining “the views of participants in the debate about what they felt should be the criteria for
success . . .” did not speak to any particular objective. In our view “indicators” should have
been closely associated with each objective, identifying how to ascertain or measure
success—but this was not the case. As a consequence of these various difficulties, we were
only able to comment upon the achievement of a few of these objectives, and to do so
through a rather ad hoc analysis of our various pieces of data.
Our third set of criteria was elicited from debate participants, via a number of open
questions in our participant questionnaires. In particular, we asked participants to indicate
what they thought was good and bad about the debate (or at least, that component with
which they were involved), and how it might be improved. By identifying themes in their
qualitative answers we were able to comment on the criteria that participants themselves
found relevant. For example, many participants assessed the quality of the debate according
to whether they had or had not learnt anything, either about the issue (GM food and crops)
or about the opinions of other people. This criterion was not specifically covered in our
universal criteria (Rowe and Frewer, 2000), nor specifically identified in the organizers’
criteria. This approach therefore also served to validate the other evaluation criteria that we
used (which will be discussed later).
5.3. Measurement issues
Following stipulation of suitable evaluation criteria against which a participation exercise is
to be judged, there is a need to develop instruments or processes to accurately measure
performance on these criteria. Such instruments are themselves open to evaluation, although
the appropriate criteria for this are perhaps less contentious than those for assessing
participation effectiveness. These criteria include reliability and validity, to which one could
also add the criterion of usability. By reliability we mean that use of the instrument is liable
to give similar results on a number of different occasions or when used by a number of
different evaluators. For example, a scale for measuring weight would be of little use if it
gave different readings each time a particular person stood on it. Likewise, if a measure of
“fairness” gave different results for a particular exercise when applied on different occasions
or by different evaluators (e.g. rated as “fair” on one occasion, but “unfair” on another), then
its lack of reliability would undermine its usefulness. Validity concerns whether the
instrument measures what is intended to be measured. A scale measuring weight should give
values related to weight and not, for example, height; an instrument measuring “fairness”
should truly measure “fairness” and not some other quality (e.g. “enjoyment” of the event).
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Usability is simply a pragmatic criterion that refers to the ability to actually deploy one’s
instrument when and where intended (Rossi et al., 1999: 252: “in addition to being reliable
and . . . valid, a good outcome measure is one that is feasible to employ, given the
constraints of time and budget”). As a case in point, we have found that lengthy
questionnaires are often resisted by organizers and sponsors unwilling to over-burden
participants: a questionnaire that could not be employed for this reason would fail the
usability criterion.
Although criteria such as reliability and validity are usually discussed in relation to the
development of questionnaires measuring psychological properties (such as IQ, job satisfac-
tion, personality type, etc.), they are conceptually relevant elsewhere, such as for participant
observation processes and document analysis. For example, an observational method that
led two different observers to conclude two different things about the exercise
being observed would not lead to confidence in the evaluative conclusions (in this case,
the type of reliability established here is inter-rater reliability). There are various dif-
ferent forms of reliability and validity, which are explained in detail in most standard social
science methodology textbooks (e.g. Bryman and Cramer, 1997; Oppenheim, 1992;
Silverman, 1998).
Unfortunately, the nature of the public engagement domain frequently makes it difficult
to establish instrument reliability and validity. In the first place, contention as to whether
there is or is not a universally relevant set of evaluation criteria has undermined any
concerted attempt by academics and practitioners to develop a coherent, structured,
validated set of off-the-shelf instruments (as has been developed to measure intelligence, for
example). Evaluators have therefore tended to develop their evaluative instruments simulta-
neous to the evaluation itself (e.g. see Rowe and Frewer (2004) for a review of instrument
and process characteristics in published evaluation studies). In the second place, the
complexity of the typical participation environment and lack of evaluator control (the nature
and manner of data collection are often at the discretion of the organizers and sponsors, not
evaluators), mean that data in a suitable form are rarely available to allow commentary on
instrument quality (reliability, validity). For example, because of the contentious nature of
evaluation, it may be difficult to convince sponsors to allow the distribution of lengthy
questionnaires (needed to obtain adequate quantities of data), let alone presenting a
particular questionnaire twice to enable its reliability to be assessed. Such complexity has
been used as an excuse by researchers and evaluators to settle for conducting informal
evaluations only: while this difficulty may mean that formal processes for establishing
aspects such as reliability and validity are difficult, the concepts cannot be ignored. We
contend that, at the very least, researchers should discuss reasons for believing that
their measures of effectiveness are reliable and valid (and ideally, evidence for the quality of
instruments should form the basis of a section in any study write-up) (Rowe and
Frewer, 2004).
In the case of the GM Nation? debate, we experienced various problems in deploying
the instruments we used (usability difficulties). At both the Foundation Discussion Work-
shops and the various Tier events, we were only able to hand out shortened versions of
questionnaires to participants (which contained key questions), although we were also able
to give participants longer questionnaires to complete at home and return to us in postage
paid envelopes. Because response rates to the questionnaires taken away were lower than for
those completed at the time, we gained less data than we might have had we been able to
present the longer questionnaire for immediate, after-event completion. This did mean,
however, that we were able to attain and compare two sets of data, and comment upon
reliability of both questionnaires. We must emphasize that comparing responses from the
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two questionnaires does not constitute a formal reliability check, in the sense that
participants were not answering exactly the same questions (as an example, in the short
questionnaires we were able to include just a single question about each of our normative
evaluation criteria, whereas there were multiple questions per criteria in the long ques-
tionnaire). Nevertheless, this approach did allow us to confirm that participants had
consistent interpretations as measured by the different items and questionnaires. For
example, participants generally rated the “independence” of those running the events highly,
as measured by single items in the short questionnaire, and several (slightly different) items
in the longer questionnaire.
In terms of validity, we attempted to establish this through triangulation using a variety
of measurement processes. In other words, we ascertained participant views via ques-
tionnaires and at the same time had observers assess the different events of the debate using
an observation protocol based upon similar criteria. The nature of the data was not strictly
comparable, but because we were able to come to roughly similar conclusions about
performance of the events on the various criteria from both approaches this increased our
confidence that both instruments (questionnaires and observation processes) were measuring
what we hoped they would measure. Furthermore, we found that the participants, in
responding to open questions about what was good and bad about the events in which they
took part, often judged the events using similar criteria to our normative ones. For example,
participants often criticized the Tier 1 events for mainly involving participants who were
against GM foods and crops, meaning that they were unable to have a proper debate with
people representing pro-GM positions. This suggests that the representativeness of partici-
pants was indeed important to them (one of our normative criteria)—and in this sense, that
the normative criteria themselves (as opposed to the instruments used to measure them) were
valid (relevant). Further, because these open responses tended to concur with a poor
assessment of the Tier 1 events on this criterion attained through the other instruments (i.e.
the direction of assessments largely corresponded to the direction of assessments attained in
response to the closed questionnaire items and the observations), this lends weight to
assertions that those other instruments were validly measuring the concepts intended. The
validity of our normative criteria, and the reliability and validity of the instruments used to
measure these, is discussed in more detail elsewhere (Rowe et al., submitted).
In summary, our discussion in this section has emphasized the difficulty in controlling
the acquisition of appropriate data to enable the formal assessment of the quality (reliability,
validity) of instruments intended to measure one’s selected evaluation criteria. However, it
also indicates a number of informal ways to make such instrument assessments (i.e.
collecting data through different processes at different times), which may help increase
evaluators’ confidence in their evaluations.
5.4. Data quality
Here we consider a number of inter-connected barriers we encountered in seeking to collect
a suitably high quality corpus of data during the evaluation exercise. We focus on the
following issues:
c uneven data coverage;
c the logistics of data collection;
c disturbing the process that we were evaluating.
5.4.1. Uneven data collection Various time and logistic constraints are bound to impinge
upon the collection of full data. Some of these constraints are more broadly applicable to
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social research. For example, as noted, the participant questionnaires we developed needed
to be relatively small so as not to over-burden participants. Other specific constraints applied
to this particular evaluation, however. We had considerable difficulty in gaining information
about the location and timing of local (Tier 2 and Tier 3) meetings, and hence we were only
able to observe (and distribute questionnaires in) a relatively small sample of these. This
particular engagement process was, however, atypical in its scope and ambition, to the
extent that even the organizers were unaware of many of the events that were held (the
Tier 3 events), and as such these could have had no impact upon the final report produced
from the debate for the sponsors.
A further specific limitation to our observational work arose as a result of our need to be
as unobtrusive as possible, which meant that only a single observer was acceptable to the
contractors at each event—although the use of audio-taping increased the amount and
precision of data gathered. However, we were not permitted observational access to the
Foundation Discussion Workshop involving those who were actively involved and inter-
ested in GM issues, which was regarded by the contractors as particularly sensitive, and so
in this case we had to rely upon tape recordings alone. We also were only able to negotiate
access to two of the ten narrow-but-deep groups (a last-minute invitation to observe a further
group proved impossible, given the existing commitments of the research team).
Naturally, limitations in data collection must impact upon the validity of an evaluation,
and it is important that these limitations be reported and considered when reporting results.
Our lack of a detailed formal contract to conduct the evaluation unfortunately meant that
we were not in a position to make more strenuous requests for information access. We
recognize that the Steering Board was in a difficult position, caught between access requests
from the evaluators and the reservations expressed by their contractors (and sub-
contractors). As we have already noted, early and formal establishment of the role, aims, and
scope of evaluation is therefore crucial to minimize such difficulties.
5.4.2. The logistics of data collection Our experience of evaluating a large, multi-
component engagement exercise like GM Nation? makes very clear the extent of practical,
logistical, difficulties that may emerge during data collection. The experimental character of
the debate gave rise to a rather untidy nexus of overlapping processes, with detailed
implementation being contingent upon decisions taken at a sometimes quite advanced stage
of the exercise. As the “public” phase of the debate approached, the pace of developments
speeded up, and “backstage” activity often took on a rather frenzied nature. Given these
circumstances, it was not possible for us to plan our data collection schedule and associated
resource demands with any degree of certainty. In response, our attempts to maintain
flexibility necessitated keeping empty diaries, and gaining the agreement of colleagues to
provide data collection support at short notice.
When the “public” phase of the debate did arrive, attempting to follow and evaluate the
Tier 3 public meetings proved especially challenging. These meetings were organized
mostly by self-selecting local voluntary organizations. In a matter of a few weeks, it seems
that literally hundreds of such meetings were organized throughout the UK, often in rather
informal ways, and with scheduling taking place over short timescales. The debate executive
appeared to have difficulty in keeping track of these developments, and at one stage, we
found that a GM pressure group website offered the most up-to-date list of local events. In
such circumstances, unsurprisingly, we were only able to gather data on a relatively small
sample of these meetings. However, this does not appear to seriously undermine our
evaluation since, as noted, the organizers and sponsors themselves were unaware of many of
Rowe et al.: Evaluating public engagement 345
these events, and hence they had little if any impact upon the summary report produced
for government.
The other major logistical challenge we faced was posed by developments in the wider
organizational and political context of the debate process. Whilst we did monitor a range of
such developments—within government, the accompanying scientific and economic
“strands” of the overall debate process, and shifting views of stakeholder organizations,
media coverage of the debate, and a major poll of public opinion—it is perhaps difficult to
conceive of any sufficiently well-resourced evaluation exercise that would be able to fully
capture the enormity of the political history of such an engagement exercise.
5.4.3. Disturbing the process being evaluated In common with all social science
research, we faced the potential difficulty of inadvertently influencing the debate process we
were studying—by collecting data, and indeed, by virtue of our mere presence. Studying
participants can rarely be achieved unobtrusively. Asking participants to complete a
questionnaire is likely to focus their thinking about the debate and perhaps raise issues that
they had not previously considered, some of which might subsequently affect their
interpretation of the process. However, by presenting questionnaires at the end of an event,
rather than at its beginning, one might hope that impact will be minimized. On the other
hand, the presence of observers is difficult to hide (indeed, if observation takes place
surreptitiously, it may raise ethical questions). Although some people may well “play to the
camera” if they feel they are being observed, we suggest that the passive involvement of a
single observer was unlikely to make a significant difference to participant behavior. Here it
should be recalled that the meetings were also being recorded and/or observed by sponsors
and organizers. Moreover, the kinds of issues being discussed were often contentious
enough to attract most participants’ full attention.
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, this possible influence can lead to evaluators
being excluded. As noted above, this happened in the case of one particular Foundation
Discussion Workshop, where our access was denied because the contractors felt that
observer presence might unsettle a potentially tricky process still further. Although the
inclusion of the evaluation in the original design of the debate might have reduced such
access difficulties, such planning seems unlikely to have entirely eliminated them.
Additionally there arises the question as to whether observer influence is a bad thing. It
is, of course, important to weigh up the (hopefully) minimal impact of evaluators on the
exercise with the potentially significant gains from a comprehensive evaluation. It is also
important to recognize that more immediate influences on the process may be beneficial
rather than detrimental: indeed, it has been suggested that one important role of evaluation
may be to allow “mid-course corrections”—identifying problems and reacting to them
before it is too late (Chess, 2000). After all, in medical trials, evidence that a treatment’s
effects are significant may lead to a study being prematurely terminated in order that those
in the control group also benefit from the new treatment. In the case of the GM Nation?
debate our presence might have been regarded as beneficial. Indeed, we have noted that it
appeared to stimulate the sponsors to think more clearly about the debate’s objectives and
produce a list of aims and indicators of success—although we found that these were not
particularly well stated or coherent. There is little evidence that this list ultimately focused
or changed the Board’s thinking on the engagement events (having only been produced after
the first public phase had already got underway!), or the processes then being delivered and
designed to implement it.
In practice we sought to minimize such influences, being fairly strict about not
providing the Steering Board or its contractors with feedback along the way. In our view,
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such interventions would have been quite inappropriate, given our role. Indeed, we take the
view that the adoption of such an interventionist role would have transformed our evaluation
exercise into a quite distinct activity, and one that could certainly not have been claimed to
be an “independent evaluation.” Of course, “keeping quiet” about aspects of the debate that
we recognized were flawed may well have resulted in various unsatisfactory outcomes for
the debate. Nevertheless, to intervene in this way would have been to interfere, and so
distort, an important experiment in engagement, and to impose our own “hunches” in
advance of completing a rigorous evaluation.
5.5. When is the evaluation exercise complete?
One difficulty associated with conducting an evaluation that is of special relevance to
practitioners, but with relevance to academic researchers, is identifying an end-point to the
engagement exercise, bearing in mind that institutional and societal responses to a particular
exercise may be manifest months or even years after it has officially finished. This is
particularly problematic when measuring outcomes (or impacts) of exercises, as distinct
from the quality of constituent processes. Hence, outcome measures may be difficult to
ascertain in a timely manner, and in any case, the outcomes themselves may be due to some
extent to other factors, such as the occurrence of simultaneous events, or externally mediated
pressures influencing policy processes (Chess and Purcell, 1999).
Sponsors of engagement exercises that involve evaluation generally desire rapid
appraisal so that this might be included in some report of the activities, and indeed, such
evaluation may have a bearing on policy outcomes arising from the exercise. Clearly this
requirement places evaluators in a contradictory situation, one characterized by Shaw (1999)
as the “rigour or relevance” dilemma. This difficulty is especially pronounced for those
carrying out independent evaluations such as ourselves in relation to GM Nation? Whilst we
wished our evaluation to be rigorous in scholarly terms and as complete as possible, there
was also a wish to retain a degree of relevance for the debate sponsors, who had, of course,
provided us with unique access to the debate process.
Although the evaluation of outcomes is perhaps preferable to processes, because these
will correspond more directly to the desired aims of the exercise, evaluation of exercise
processes must often serve as a surrogate to outcomes. That is, if the exercise process is
“good” (conducted well according to one’s definition) then it would seem more likely that
the outcomes will be good than if the process is “bad.” In the case of GM Nation? our focus
was therefore on the process, though we retain an interest in following the impact of
the exercise.
It is important to recognize the sense of political urgency and importance association
with the outcome of the GM Nation? debate. Indeed, with the publication of the Field Scale
trials imminent, the Steering Board was under considerable pressure from government to
deliver its final report according to a strict deadline (it appeared just ten weeks after the end
of the debate). Elsewhere we have argued that the resulting sense of hurry resulted in an
“over-hasty, under-resourced and methodologically worrying analysis of findings” (Horlick-
Jones et al., 2004: 133). Although our own analysis was insufficiently complete to publish
anything to coincide with the Steering Board’s report, we were invited to submit evidence to
a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of the debate, and we managed to prepare a
memorandum in time for the inquiry hearings in October 2003 (Horlick-Jones et al., 2003).
It was not until February 2004 that we were ready to publish a substantial evaluation
statement (Horlick-Jones et al., 2004). At the time of writing this paper, work on the
substantial corpus of data we collected is still taking place.
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5.6. Relations with the debate organizers and other stakeholders
The evaluation of public participation exercises is relatively rare. While a number of the
problems previously discussed ensure that the process is a difficult one, and may deter
researchers, practitioners, organizers and sponsors from conducting evaluations, there are
further strategic, or perhaps, political, difficulties that may also militate against the conduct
of evaluations. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, “it is almost inevitable that an
evaluation has a political dimension to it” (Robson, 2002).
The meaning of the word “political” here needs a little discussion. In many ways, the
practicalities of evaluation work are far closer to those of “action research” than those
associated with “detached scholarly inquiry.” Those actively engaged in the resolution of
problem situations whilst conducting research commonly find themselves engaged in “quasi
consultancy,” necessitating a keen awareness of client/gatekeepers’ needs and expectations,
and the often messy and convoluted politics of the organizations in question and their
relations with the outside world (Horlick-Jones and Rosenhead, 2002).
A number of potentially difficult issues arise from the structural nature of the
relationship between evaluators and the sponsors (and their executive) of engagement
processes, and one might anticipate finding:
c Evaluators taking up a great deal of time of busy sponsors/executives asking questions
and making various other demands;
c Sponsor/executive anxiety that evaluators might interpret complex issues in inaccurate
or stereotypical ways;
c A potential culture clash, with evaluators’ ways of behaving, talking, and framing
issues making sponsors/executives feel uncomfortable;
c The expert status of sponsors/executives being scrutinized by people who are members
of their professional “tribe”;
c A sense of vulnerability on the part of sponsors/executives, with possible mistakes and
difficulties being carefully recorded.
Indeed, whilst conducting our evaluation of the GM Nation? debate, we encountered a
number of difficulties of this kind. Most could be resolved fairly easily with patience and
good will on both sides. On other occasions, concerns and discomfort persisted for an
extended period, and they almost certainly had some negative impact on the overall quality
of the evaluation, albeit a minor one.
Turning to the wider community of stakeholders, we found that our role as independent
evaluators was predominantly accepted, and indeed valued. Of course, in highly charged
policy areas like the ones related to transgenic crops, one would expect the evaluation
findings to be contested by groups for which the conclusions were politically uncomfortable.
In order to allow as much opportunity as possible for stakeholder groups to comment upon
our evaluation, we carried out a consultation exercise, entailing posting the report on the
University of East Anglia website, making copies of the report widely available, and holding
a major day-long presentation and workshop in London to which key stakeholder groups in
government, business and non-governmental organizations were invited. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, we received relatively few detailed responses from this consultation exercise. We
recognize that there was some discontent about our evaluation within the anti-GM lobby
(and its supporters), however, we understand these criticisms to be political in nature rather
than being based on a technical critique of our execution of the evaluation process that we
set out to conduct. The tactic in these quarters seems to have been to largely ignore our
work, which we regard to be a measure of its robust nature.
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5.7. The resource demands of the evaluation exercise
Finally, we briefly consider the costs of carrying out the evaluation of the GM Nation?
public debate. Whilst the core evaluation team comprised six individuals, we were fortunate
in being able to gain support from a number of colleagues, and from scholars in two other
universities. In total, over 20 individuals were involved in playing some part in the data
collection. As noted above, work on the substantial corpus of data we collected is
continuing—focusing on the dynamics of the “narrow-but-deep” process—a year or so after
the publication of our major evaluation report in February 2004.
We estimate the direct cost of the evaluation process leading up to the February 2004
report (including our major nationwide survey of public opinion) as approximately
£175,000. Clearly this is a non-trivial sum, and, in comparison with the cost to the UK
government of sponsoring the debate, can be seen as amounting to the equivalent of some
15–20 percent of the debate’s running costs. (The official cost of the debate, quoted in the
Steering Board’s final report (PDSB, 2003: 64), was £650,000.) However, the true costs,
taking account of time put in by Steering Board members, as well as organization and
publicity for Tier 2 and 3 events conducted by other parties, was undoubtedly far greater.
This approximate percentage assumes a “true” figure closer to £1,000,000 for the debate
process as a whole. Despite our evaluation being extensive in comparison to other such
exercises, we encountered a number of shortcomings and difficulties (discussed in this
paper), some of which (particularly the logistical ones) could have been addressed had we
had access to more substantial resources. Our experience therefore offers a serious caution
to would-be evaluators, and to potential sponsors of engagement exercises who intend to
include an evaluation component within the overall exercise budget.
6. Conclusions
The evaluation of public engagement exercises is full of difficulties, ranging from the
theoretical (what do we mean by effective public engagement?) and practical (how do we go
about measuring effectiveness in the highly complex engagement environment?), to the
political (how does one conduct evaluations in an environment full of competing parties
with contrasting motives?). In this paper we have discussed a number of these difficulties in
the context of a specific evaluation of a recent major engagement event in the UK.
One clear conclusion from this discussion is that there are limitations to any evaluation,
particularly given the controversial issue of what we mean by engagement “effectiveness”
and the general absence of well-validated instruments. For the unconvinced sponsor (e.g.
one that is compelled, perhaps by statute, to conduct a participatory exercise) this realization
might even come to be regarded as a boon. If the evaluation process is somehow flawed,
then need it be conducted, or if conducted, need the results be heeded? Any criticism
produced may thus be open to dispute by those against whom the criticism is leveled, or in
the case of a positive assessment of an exercise, by those who disagree with the exercise
outcomes. Ultimately, it is the sponsor that wields most power, and the evaluator, in order to
gain a commission or to conduct research, may need to concede and conduct their evaluation
in a way they would not ideally wish to do. Although unfettered evaluation activity may be
undesirable, and possibly troublesome, for a sponsor, excessive sponsor interference in the
evaluation process risks biasing the evaluation, and, if discovered by competing stake-
holders, might lead to charges that undermine the whole exercise.
It is also important to note that it is difficult to stop some form of evaluation being
conducted on any given engagement exercise (particularly after the event). Such evaluations
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might be conducted by academics, perhaps sponsored by participants or other interested
bodies. If conducted outside the control or influence of the main sponsor, then there may be
bias in the evaluation towards the position of the other parties, and bias might also arise
from incomplete evaluator knowledge of sponsor motives and other information related to
the exercise. Such “unofficial” evaluations may therefore prove problematic. As such, it is
probably best for the sponsor to provide for an evaluation to be conducted at the outset, and
ensure that the process will be fair from all perspectives, particularly its own.
Finally, we wish to reiterate our belief that evaluation is a crucial process for
engagement exercises, particularly in the current political climate in which the popularity
of engagement as a policy tool is increasing, accompanied by a growth in the number of
proposed mechanisms that might be used in implementing such processes. Rigorous
evaluation is clearly not easy. However, through the use of sound research methodology,
which recognizes the nature of this difficult research environment (including the strategic
and political imperatives of those involved), good, insightful evaluations may be conducted.
In this paper, and in others reporting the specifics of our evaluation, we have identified a
number of ways in which research difficulties might be overcome—for example, using
multiple qualitative and quantitative methods to enhance the likely validity of one’s
evaluation. One important practical consequence of further evaluation research and practice,
we hope, will be an enhanced quality of public engagement, in terms of the suitable choice
of mechanisms to use in any particular situation, and their appropriate implementation.
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